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Non-proliferation is a major concern of the 
international community, the United States, and Russia.  
This thesis examines Russia’s role in the non-proliferation 
regime through 2004.  Russia has continually said it is 
committed to non-proliferation; however, some of its 
actions contradict its rhetoric. Although Russia’s 
violation of international agreements on non-proliferation 
is minimal, it is important to understand why Russia 
transfers nuclear technology.  This thesis uses two case 
studies — Russian nuclear sales to Iran and India — to 
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Nuclear proliferation is a top concern of the United 
States, the Russian government, and the international 
community.  Russia has repeatedly stated its commitment to 
non-proliferation.  On April 28, 2004, the UN Security 
Council adopted a new resolution that reaffirms the 
council’s commitment to non-proliferation of nuclear 
weapons.  However, even though Russia ascribes to 
international rhetoric on non-proliferation, it appears 
that its actions have not met the standards of the 
international community.1 
States that pursue nuclear power solely as a cheap and 
efficient alternative to energy production help preserve 
the Earth’s natural resources.  However, nuclear weapons 
programs are often obtained by countries through nuclear 
power programs and the dual use technology those nuclear 
power programs provide.  Once nuclear technology is 
obtained, weaponization is generally the easy part of the 
process.2  Therefore, if the underlying motive in obtaining 
nuclear power is to develop nuclear weapons, then the 
implications for regional and global stability could be 
deadly.   
This thesis examines the extent and underlying cause 
of Russian dual-use nuclear technology exports, and also 




2 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies 
Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction, OTA-BP-ISC-115 (Washington, 




examines the implications of the presence of dual-use 
nuclear technology in the global market on regional and 
global security.  The primary reason for Russian 
exportation of nuclear technology is financial gain. 
Russia does not directly sell nuclear weapons, but its 
support of other nation’s nuclear power programs 
facilitates nuclear proliferation.  How has Russia’s role 
in Iran’s nuclear power program translated into the 
prospect of a nuclear weapons program?  It is the position 
of the United States that nuclear power in the hands of 
authoritarian regimes, such as Iran and North Korea, 
creates regional and global instability and threatens U.S. 
national security.  The threat to national security comes 
from the possibility of states sponsoring terrorism by 
supplying resources to terrorists in the form of weapons 
and capital.  With the proliferation of nuclear power, U.S. 
leaders fear that terrorist groups will be able to gain 
control of an active nuclear weapon in the future. 
A. NON-PROLIFERATION REGIMES 
The proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) 
is a concern of the United States, Russia, and the 
international community alike and has been for quite some 
time.  It is necessary to understand some of the measures, 
and their successes, that have been put in place throughout 
the years to curb proliferation.   
The International Atomic Energy Agency was created in 
1957 by the UN under the auspices of the Atoms for Peace 
organization in order to encourage the development of 
atomic energy for peaceful purposes throughout the world.  
The most important role the IAEA fulfills is ensuring that 
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atomic energy is used for peaceful purposes and that no 
material or equipment is applied to military use.3  It 
became apparent that the Atoms for Peace program was ill 
equipped to detect or prevent the diversion of the amount 
of material enough to build a weapon.  Therefore, a 
different program had to be created.4 
In 1958 Irish Foreign Minister Frank Aiken submitted 
the first draft of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 
(NPT) to the UN General Assembly.5  Several drafts and 
several years later the NPT was finally negotiated in 1968.  
In 1970 the five nuclear ‘haves’ (the United States, the 
former Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, and China) were 
among the original 43 members.  Its efforts were meant to 
persuade the nuclear ‘haves’ to eventually disarm and to 
share peaceful nuclear technology and for the nuclear ‘have 
nots’ to not attempt to attain nuclear weapons technology.6  
Since 1968 the IAEA has fairly successfully enforced the 
provisions of the NPT by minimizing the amount of states 
with access to nuclear weapons technology for over thirty 
years. 
Throughout the years the members of the 
Nonproliferation Regime have created other organizations to 
help prevent the spread of nuclear weapons technology, 
weapons delivery technology, and other weapons of mass 
destruction technology.  Organizations such as the Missile 
Technology Control Regime, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and 
                     3 International Atomic Energy Agency, “Statute of the IAEA” (Vienna, 
2003), http://www.iaea.or.at/About/history.html. 
 4 Henry Sokolski, Best of Intentions: America’s Campaign Against 
Strategic Weapons Proliferation (Westport, 2001), 33. 
5 Ibid, 41. 
6 U.S. Department of State “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons,” http://www.state.gov/t/np/trty/16281.htm. 
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the Australia Group, effectively prevented the spread of 
undesirable technology by creating elite and discriminatory 
groups.7  Russia is a member of all except for the Australia 
group.  In January 1992, the United Nations Secretary 
General readdressed the issue of proliferation in a 
Presidential Statement which stated that “the proliferation 
of all WMD constitutes a threat to international peace and 
security, and underlines the need for member states of the 
UN to prevent proliferation.”8  This statement serves to 
reemphasize the importance of maintaining proliferation of 
nuclear weapons technology as close to zero as possible. 
The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is the 
newest attempt to prevent the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction.  It was announced by President Bush on 
May 31, 2003 to pose a multinational response to the 
continually increasing efforts of rogue nations and other 
prospective proliferators.  There are currently over one 
hundred signatories to PSI.9  This is a critical step 
towards implementing the UN Security Council Presidential 
Statement of January 1992.10  In 2004, Russia committed 
itself as the fifteenth participant in PSI.11 
                      7 Sokolski, Best of Intentions: America’s Campaign Against Strategic 
Weapons Proliferation (Westport, 2001), 6-7. 
8 U.S. Department of State Fact Sheet, “Proliferation Security 
Initiative: Statement of Interdiction Principles” (Washington D.C., 
September 4, 2003), http://www.state.gov/t/np/rls/fs/23764.htm. 
9 Andrew C. Winner, “The Proliferations Security Initiative: The New 
Face of Interdiction,” The Washington Quarterly (Spring 2005). 
10 U.S. Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs, “Proliferation 
Security Initiative” (Washington, D.C., September 15, 2003), 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/rls/24134.htm. 
11 Jeremy Bransten, “Russia Joins U.S. Led-Initiative on WMD,” Radio 




B. MOTIVATIONS FOR RUSSIAN PROLIFERATION 
To what extent and why does Russia export dual-use 
nuclear technology to countries of proliferation concern 
(e.g., Iran and India)?  In the post-Cold War era, Russia’s 
ability to maintain its nuclear arsenal and its nuclear 
research program diminished as its economic situation 
worsened.  Economic decline has made it difficult for 
Russia to support the program that ensured its superpower 
status.  This economic decline is the primary reason Russia 
exports dual-use nuclear technology.   
Not only is it hard for Russia to economically 
maintain disarmament goals established by non-proliferation 
treaties, but Russia also struggles to maintain the quality 
of life and standard of living for its technicians and 
experts as the priority for nuclear research programs has 
gone by the wayside.  As these experts’ compensation and 
benefits decline the threat of information, technology 
sales, and even defection to non-nuclear states by private 
actors increases.  Similarly, due to the declining standard 
of living for nuclear technicians it is just as challenging 
to recruit new engineers to help maintain technological 
advances in the future, to include safety lockouts and safe 
handling procedures. 
Strategic cooperation is the secondary reason that 
Russia exports nuclear technology.  Russia feels that if it 
can get a foothold in the economies and policies of 
countries such as India and Iran, it will have a basis to 
affect the way decisions are made in those regions.  By 
selling India and Iran nuclear technology, Russia will be 
providing them with needed services that can be turned on 
or off depending on how satisfied Russia remains with the 
6 
regional policies.  Additionally, cooperation with these 
countries gives Russia an opportunity to build strategic 
regional alliances throughout the world.   
Finally, bureaucratic politics is a tertiary factor 
that has led Russia to export nuclear technology.  The 
Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy attempted to maintain its 
current status and improve its program priority into the 
future.  I will argue that it often looked to exploit 
loopholes in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 
order to obtain capital from foreign countries by selling 
dual-use nuclear technology. 
Understanding the extent and reasons Russia played (or 
continues to play) a role in the past in the exportation of 
dual-use nuclear technology will assist in formulating 
cogent non-proliferation policy.  It is imperative all 
Nuclear powers work together with Russia to prevent further 
nuclear proliferation in order to prevent rogue states from 
obtaining nuclear weapons.  Concerns of diverted fissile 
material and/or scientific defection from Russia to 
countries such as Iran, North Korea, or Syria continue to 
remain prevalent in the international community.  According 
to a survey published in a Program on New Approaches to 
Russian Security (PONARS) by Deborah Yarsike Ball and 
Theodore P. Gerber, “roughly 20 percent of Russian 
physicists, biologists, and chemists said they would 
consider working in rogue nations…”12 
 
 
                     12 Deborah Yarsike Ball and Theodore P. Gerber, “Will Russian 
Scientists go Rogue? A Survey on the Threat and the Impact of Western 
Assistance,” PONARS Policy Memo 357 (November 2004), 1. 
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C. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
The first chapter will address the argument that 
Russia has encouraged, nuclear proliferation through the 
sale of dual-use nuclear technology because of its 
declining economic situation and internal bureaucratic 
politics.  Russia has sold dual-use nuclear technology to 
countries whose future intentions may be destabilizing to 
regional and global stability.  These intentions could 
include the future proliferation of nuclear technology or 
the sale of nuclear weapons to non-state actors.   
Chapter II examines the evolution of the Russian 
atomic energy agency.  Additionally, it inspects the 
leadership of that and follow-on agencies, and how they 
manage nuclear policy.  Lastly, after giving the reader an 
understanding of the basis on which Russian foreign and 
domestic nuclear policy is formulated, this chapter 
develops the key factors for Russia’s export of dual use 
nuclear technology. 
Chapter III studies why Russia is considering selling 
India nuclear technology and nuclear submarines.  Since 
1998 Russia has provided India’s Advanced Technology Vessel 
(ATV) nuclear submarine program assistance, including 
assistance in installing propulsion reactors for the two 
submarines laid down under this program.13  The ATV might be 
able to launch nuclear-capable missiles.  This possible 
capability is also reported to have been initially headed 
by a Russian scientist.14  Russia previously leased an older 
                     13 “Russia helps India build nuclear submarine,” Bellona Foundation 
website, http://www.bellona.org/e/russia/nfl/news/980917-2.htm. 
14 Rahul Bedi, “Agni II Now in Production,” Jane’s Missiles and 
Rockets, Vol. 5, No. 8, August 1, 2001; in Lexis-Nexis Academic 
Universe, http://web.lexis-nexis.com. 
8 
nuclear Charlie I class submarine to India with a Russian 
crew operating the reactor.15  If the sale of nuclear 
propulsion reactors to India does not happen, then it is 
also possible that India will purchase or lease one or more 
Russian nuclear submarines.  These submarines may be 
operated by only Indian crews.16  Why is Russia willing to 
sell nuclear submarines and technology to India, 
potentially allowing that technology to be available on the 
global market? 
Chapter IV inspects why Russia provided Iran nuclear 
aid and continues to make arrangements for continued 
support.  When the nuclear power plant at Bushehr becomes 
operational, how will Iran operate it and what will happen 
to the spent fuel?  Russia has stated that it would take 
back all of Iran’s spent fuel.  However, given Russia’s 
economic weakness and its inability to take care of its own 
spent fuel and decommissioned naval vessels,17 this scenario 
may not be as certain as Russia would like the 
international community to think.  Why would Russia accept 
this economic burden if it was unable to carry it out?  
Further, if it is unable to carry it out why would Russia 
risk leaving Iran with spent nuclear fuel, potentially 
enabling its use in a nuclear weapons program.  Also, 
Russia plans on operating the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant 
with a mixed Russian-Iranian crew of which about 100 




17 Cristina Chuen, “Russian Nuclear Exports to Iran: U.S. Policy 
Change Needed,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 
http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/030327.htm. 
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Iranian specialists are currently being trained in Moscow.18  
Again, the possibility of Iranian control of spent nuclear 
fuel and the existence of trained specialists solicits the 
question of why Russia would run the risk of giving Iran 
all the tools to create its own nuclear weapons program.   
Chapter V offers conclusions about the factors that 
have caused Russia to support dual-use nuclear exports.  
Implications for the United States, Russia, and the 
international community of future proliferation are also 
discussed, as well as recommendations to prevent this from 
continuing to happen. 
D. CONCLUSIONS 
There are a variety of reasons Russia continues to 
export dual-use nuclear technology.  The primary reason is 
economic gain.  The revenues Russia has received from 
nuclear sales helps maintain its failing nuclear industry 
as well as its failing defense industry.  Another reason is 
strategic cooperation.  The two case studies examined 
reveal a long standing tradition of strategic cooperation 
with Russia and India and Russia and Iran.  Indications are 
that Russia wishes to foster this cooperation with India 
and Iran.  Another possibility is that Russia fully 
supports nuclear non-proliferation and it feels it is fully 
complying with international standards.  Pressures from the 
United States and the international community for Russia to 
stop certain actions that can be construed questionable, 
but do not violate any treaties, are usually met with a 
cold shoulder by Russia.  Additionally, Russia will 
                     18 Interfax, May 28, 2002; in “Russia to train around 100 Iranian 
engineers to operate Bushehr-1 nuclear plant,” FBIS Document 
CEP20020528000137. 
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continue to argue that none of its actions violate 
international agreements and will continue to act in 
manners it perceives are beneficial to Russia.  In many 
cases this may include stopping previous support and sales 
to countries like Iran and India. 
11 
II. RUSSIA’S NUCLEAR POLICY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Russian nuclear policy after the Cold War has and 
continues to change immensely.  The recent and continuing 
transition to democracy in Russia is driving these changes, 
as well as the way the world has been transforming.  
Nuclear non-proliferation took on a new importance 
following the end of the Cold War and even more so since 
September 11, 2001.  However, both the United States and 
the Soviet Union have sold nuclear technology to non-
nuclear states in the past.  After the Cold War, both 
superpowers realized it would be to their advantage to 
support the non-proliferation regime.  Both Russia and the 
United States realized that the possibility of nuclear 
technology escaping from the former Soviet Union had 
significantly increased.19 
An examination of the role of nuclear policy in the 
Russian Federation government is necessary to understand 
why Russia continues to transfer dual-use nuclear 
technology and initially refrained from one of the most 
current efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation (the 
Proliferation Security Initiative).  This chapter explains 
how domestic and foreign nuclear policy is made in Russia. 
Additionally, this chapter describes who administers 
nuclear policy in Russia and how.  Lastly, this chapter 
discusses the basis on which Russian domestic and foreign 
nuclear policy is formulated, and the key factors why it 
has exported and continues to export nuclear technology. 
                     19 Henry Sokolski, Best of Intentions: America’s Campaign Against 
Strategic Weapons Proliferation (Westport, 2001), 6-7. 
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B. MAKING RUSSIAN POLICY 
Who makes Russian policy and, more specifically, who 
makes Russian nuclear policy?  Although Russia began to 
transition to a democratic state over ten years ago, it 
still has not fully democratized.  The Russian Constitution 
affords an immense amount of power to its President.  This 
hyper-presidential system makes it extremely hard to remove 
the elected president from office.  Even in the last months 
of Yeltsin’s term, when his popularity dropped to single 
digits, it would have been next to impossible to remove him 
from office.  Instead, he resigned in order to give his 
designated successor, Vladimir Putin, the upper hand in the 
next election by allowing Putin the luxury of serving in 
office prior to the popular election.20  The Russian 
President has more power than the U.S. President, or more 
accurately the Russian Parliament (Duma) and the Russian 
judicial system have less ability than their counterparts 
in the United States to check the Russian President.  Even 
policies which are unpopular with the Russian Parliament 
will not affect the Russian President or his reelection; 
therefore, policies which strengthen the state’s 
presidential system are more likely to be implemented.21 
Additionally, over the past four years, President 
Putin has taken extraordinary measures to restrict the 
freedom of the Russian media.  There are very few media 
outlets in Russia that are not state run, and the ones that 
are not, tend to censor themselves in order to avoid state 
action.  With this control over the press, Putin is able to 
shape public opinion in ways that he believes are for the                      20 Archie Brown, Contemporary Russian Politics: A Reader (Oxford, 
2001), 85. 
21 Lilia Shevtsova, Putin’s Russia (Washington, D.C., 2003), 8. 
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good of the state.22  By doing this, President Putin’s 
popularity remained high throughout his first term, and 
enabled him to be re-elected in 2004 with a vast majority 
of the popular vote.  Whether the election was free and 
fair is an argument within Russia’s population 
(specifically fueled by Putin’s opposing candidates) and 
within the international community.  Reported in the Radio 
Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s January 8, 2004, issue of 
(Un)Civil Societies, many of the liberal parties united to 
boycott the Russian presidential election.  Yabloko leader 
Grigorii Yavlinskii was specifically quoted as saying 
“free, equal, and politically competitive elections are 
impossible.”23  Although this sentiment was really carried 
over from the December 2003 elections, it held true 
throughout the March 2004 presidential elections. 
Putin’s second term will be a defining moment for 
Russia.  In his first term, Putin consolidated much of his 
power and strengthened the presidency.  The target of his 
first term was the oligarchy and early indications are that 
the bureaucracy will be the target of his second term.  
After the re-inauguration on May 7, 2004, expectations were 
that 25 percent of the 1,000 presidential staff members 
were be cut, along with 20 percent of the overall 
government.  However, the money saved will not go back into 
the state, but toward increasing senior officials’ 
salaries.24  This will mean that some of the government 
organizations to include the nuclear industry will still 
                     22 Shevtsova, Putin’s Russia, 8, 176-7. 
23 “Russian Election Boycott: Treading a Fine Line,” Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty (January 8, 2004, Vol. 5, No. 1), 
http://www.rferl.org/reports/ucs/2004/01/1-080104.asp. 
24 The Economist, “Slaying his own dragons” (May 1, 2004), 50-51. 
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have economic shortfalls.  This will create the need for 
those organizations to infuse money into their 
organizations any way they can.  For the Atomic Energy 
Agency that may mean foreign sales to countries like Iran 
and India.25 
C. MAKING AND ADMINISTERING NUCLEAR POLICY 
1. Ministry of Atomic Energy (MinAtom) 
There have been several agencies in the Soviet Union 
and Russia assigned to oversee the development, production, 
testing, and delivery of nuclear energy and nuclear 
weapons.  The first was called the Council of Ministers 
(1945-1953).  It was replaced by the Ministry of Medium 
Machine-Building from 1953-1986, and the last Soviet 
organization was the Ministry of Atomic Power and Industry 
(MAPI) from 1986-1992.  Under Soviet rule, these agencies 
were power brokers with a lot of influence on the USSR’s 
decision-making loop.26  Since the fall of the Soviet Union, 
the Ministry of Atomic Energy has been the agency in charge 
of Russia’s nuclear industry; however, its influence waned, 
which is evident with the changes of leadership throughout 
the years as I will show in the following section. 
The first director of MinAtom was Viktor Mikhailov 
from 1992 until his unexpected retirement in 1998.  During 
this time, nuclear material was heavily guarded and nuclear 
security continued to be taken very seriously.  However, 
deals on nuclear exports were comparatively liberal.  
                     25 Celeste Wallander, “Russia’s Interest in Trading with the ‘Axis of 
Evil,’” Testimony for “Russia’s Policies Toward the Axis of Evil: Money 
and Geopolitics in Iraq and Iran,” Hearing before the House Committee 
on International Relations, February 26, 2003.  
http://wwwa.house.gov//international_relations/108/wall0226.htm. 
26 Federation of American Scientists, “Ministry of Atomic Energy 
(Minatom),” http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/agency/minatom.htm. 
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Strategic nuclear cooperation with Iran commenced under 
Mikhailov’s watch.27  The first change of leadership to 
MinAtom indicated no change in the influence of the Nuclear 
Ministry upon Russian policy since the person who replaced 
Mikhailov was a protégé of his and held similar views on 
nuclear power.  When Mikhailov retired, Western hopes were 
that US-Russian nuclear cooperation would be strengthened, 
but when Yevgeny Adamov assumed the responsibilities as the 
head of Russia’s Nuclear Ministry, those hopes were dashed. 
When he became the new Minister of Atomic Energy, 
Adamov continued nuclear cooperation with Iran (which the 
United States had hoped would be discontinued) and he 
instituted other questionable and corrupt policies.28  
Adamov used his position as the head of MinAtom to 
strengthen his financial position, to appoint business 
associates to key positions, and to undermine Russia’s non-
proliferation obligations.  During his time in charge, most 
of MinAtom’s budget was kept secret making the ministry 
prone to accusations of concealing information on nuclear 
deals and participating in fund misappropriations.29  The 
primary reason for Adamov’s dismissal, according to Boris 
Nemtsov, a member of the State Duma, was that information 
about corruption within the ministry had been spread 
throughout the Duma.  But other speculations on the reason 
of the dismissal include that Adamov was one of the last 
                     27 Igor Khripunov, “Russia’s Nukes: MinAtom at the Edge,” Bulletin of 
the Atomic Scientists (May/June 1999, Vol. 55, No. 3). 
28 Craig Cerniello, “Yeltsin Government Shake-Up Unlikely to Affect 
Arms Control,” Arms Control Today (March 1998), 
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/1998_03/shakeup.asp. 
29 Rashid Alimov and Igor Kudrik, “Adamov sacked for unprofitable 
proliferation” (March 29, 2001), 
http://www.bellona.no/en/international/russia/waste-mngment/20030.html. 
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remaining members of the Yeltsin government and Putin 
replaced him in order to strengthen his control.30 
Alexander Rumyantsev replaced Adamov on March 28, 
2001.  Rumyantsev continued many of the cooperative 
programs already in place, specifically cooperation with 
Iran, but he made many changes within the ministry.  He 
reduced the employment of the organization to six hundred 
from three thousand (designed to enable the ministry to run 
more effectively).  Additionally, he reinitiated the 
attempt to incorporate all atomic activities under one 
State-owned nuclear corporation.  These actions indicate 
that he is an economic liberal.31  These indications lend 
credibility to the theory that Putin appointed Rumyantsev 
to regain control of Russia’s nuclear complex. 
2. Federal Atomic Energy Agency 
On February 24, 2004, President Putin dismissed the 
Russian government and on March 9 appointed a new 
government with major structural changes.  Part of the 
structural changes included cutting 13 ministries, one of 
which was the Ministry of Atomic Energy.  This action 
reduced MinAtom’s role in the Russian government.  Rather 
than merging with the Ministry of Energy, MinAtom has been 
renamed the Federal Atomic Energy Agency (FAEA) and is 
still headed by Rumyantsev.  When asked if he preferred 
merging with the Ministry of Energy or being reduced in  
 
 
                     30 Thomas Nilsen and Vlad Nikiforov, “Adamov fired” (March 28, 2001), 
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31 World Investment News, “Interview with Mr. Alexander Yu. 
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rank within the executive hierarchy, but still maintaining 
an indigenous and separate nuclear sector, Rumyanstev told 
Moscow Rossiyskaya Gazeta: 
Of course, the second, preserving the unity of 
the sector.  For me this is not even a question. 
And I and all my predecessors have invariably 
defended the unity of the nuclear-power-
generation complex.  It took form in our country 
in a completely special manner — a unified 
structural unit, a unified network of design 
organizations, and the centralized production of 
dual-use nuclear materials.  Try to divide this 
up and the consequences could be deplorable.32 
FAEA fell under the Ministry of Industry and Science 
directed by Viktor Khristenko for approximately four 
months, but in late May President Putin released a new 
decree placing the FAEA directly under the Prime Minister, 
Mikhail Fradkov.33  It is unclear why this move was made in 
such a short time after changing the organization of the 
government.  Khristenko was certainly qualified to run his 
department with the FAEA in it, and he has had extensive 
experience in developing Russia’s economic infrastructure 
and has a background as a strong economic reformist.34  
However, this change may be to give FAEA a higher status, 
but the question remains as to why Putin demoted the 
Ministry in the first place.  Certainly, time is needed to 
effectively evaluate the direction President Putin and his 
newly appointed government will take Russia and its 
ministries.  Optimists for Russia’s development analyze 
                     32 Aleksandr Yemelyanenkov, “Former Russian Atomic Energy Minister 
Interviewed on Sector's Reduced Status,” FBIS, March 23, 2004. 
33 “Russian Government Restructuring and the Future of WMD Threat 
Reduction Cooperation,” RANSAC Policy Update (May 21, 2004), 
http://www.ransac.org/Documents/rfgovtreorgupdate05212004.pdf. 
34 Pravda.RU, “President Putin dismisses Cabinet” (February 24, 
2004), http://newsfromrussia.com/main/2004/02/24/52476.html. 
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many of President Putin’s actions as necessary steps for 
reform and pessimists argue that he has taken too much 
liberty in controlling liberal organizations, such as the 
media.  Now that Putin has been reelected, the actions he 
and his administration take in his second and last term as 
president may well determine the future of Russia. 
D. THE BASIS OF RUSSIAN NUCLEAR POLICY 
On what basis has Russia formulated its nuclear 
policy?  There are several different possible sources for 
Russia’s decisions on nuclear policy.  The two most obvious 
reasons are economic gain and strategic cooperation.  Other 
drivers of Russian nuclear policy are making political 
statements, research and development, energy concerns, and 
environmental considerations. 
According to Jacob Viner, power is inseparable with 
wealth: 
I believe that practically all mercantilists, 
whatever the period, country, or status of the 
particular individual, would have subscribed to 
all of the following propositions: (1) wealth is 
an absolutely essential means to power, whether 
for security or for aggression; (2) power is 
essential or valuable as a means to the 
acquisition or retention of wealth; (3) wealth 
and power are each proper ultimate ends of 
national policy; (4) there is long-run harmony 
between these ends, although in particular 
circumstances it may be necessary for a time to 
make economic sacrifices in the interest of 
military security and therefore also of long-run 
prosperity.35 
                     35 Jacob Viner, “Power Versus Plenty as Objectives of Foreign Policy 
in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,” World Politics (Vol. 1, 
No. 1, October 1948), 10. 
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In Russia’s case, it seems that remains the case.  
Although Russia is definitely still a world power, its 
economic decline has caused its power and international 
influence to wane slightly.  Using Viner’s model it is 
difficult to separate the economic reasons and the 
strategic reasons.  By examining the long term effects of a 
strong economy, one can postulate economic power would 
improve Russia’s strategic standing in the world.  In fact, 
a weak economy is one of the few things currently 
preventing Russia from regaining the status held by the old 
Soviet Union.  Russia’s economy did very well in 2003 (7.3 
percent growth rate); however, that figure may be somewhat 
misleading.  Growth for 2003 was largely based on greater 
commodity exports and the wealthiest 20 percent of the 
population accounting for 46 percent of total revenues.36  
Additionally, this upward rate appears to be sustaining 
itself.37 
1. Economic 
By selling nuclear technology and engaging in dual-use 
nuclear exports, Russia is able to remain competitive in 
the nuclear sector by using capital gains to fund further 
projects that include advanced research and development. 
However, the spent nuclear fuel project between Russia and 
Iran may only be able to fund safe storage of the spent 
fuel imported from Iran and other existing materials, 
leaving little capital left for research and development  
 
 
                     36 Peter Aven, “Russian Economic Growth: Glass Half Empty or Half 
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and advanced projects.  This may cause the Federal Atomic 
Energy Agency to cut corners, possibly leading to unsafe 
practices.38 
In President Putin’s State of the Nation address on 
May 26, 2004, he emphasized economic growth as his number 
one priority for the future. 
We must grow faster than the rest of the world if 
we want to take the lead in today’s difficult 
conditions of global competition. We must be 
ahead of other countries in our growth rate, the 
quality of our goods and services and level of 
our education, science and culture. This is a 
question of our economic survival. It is a 
question of ensuring that Russia takes its 
deserved place in these changing international 
conditions.39 
Putin stated later in his address that he hoped 
Russia’s per capita GDP would double by 2010.40  Nuclear 
exports add to Russia’s overall GDP and are a good way to 
help it obtain Putin’s goals.  By selling nuclear reactors 
and technology within the constraints of international 
agreements to Iran, Russia is able to stimulate its economy 
during its weaker stages and help it grow stronger.41 
Sales from nuclear materials and technology ranged 
from 2 to 2.5 billion US dollars in the early 1990s.  This 
money, although small in relation to Russia’s overall 
export economy, helps keep the industry alive as well as 
                     38 Chuen, “Russian Nuclear Exports to Iran: U.S. Policy Change 
Needed.”  
39 President Vladimir Putin, “Address to the Federal Assembly of the 
Russian Federation” (May 26, 2004), 
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40 Ibid. 
41 Wallander, “Russia’s Interest in Trading with the ‘Axis of Evil.’” 
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help pay the technicians and experts keeping them employed 
in Russia and reducing the proliferation risk.42 
2. Strategic 
For Russia to export dual-use nuclear technology seems 
to be contrary to its security interests.  By maintaining 
itself as a nuclear power and preventing other countries 
from obtaining nuclear weapons, Russia will continue to 
maintain its superpower status.  However, if its economy 
does not improve, its nuclear infrastructure will continue 
to fail. By preventing other countries from becoming 
nuclear powers, Russia would be able to keep the membership 
in that elite club to a minimum. 
I will argue the strategic reason Russia is selling 
nuclear technology to countries such as Iran and India is 
to gain a foothold in their markets.43  The economic 
reasons, although very strong, start to fall apart when one 
examines some of the technology being sold to Iran.  
Centrifuges and laser technology are used for uranium 
enrichment and further Iran’s indigenous nuclear program.44  
By allowing Iran or India to create an indigenous nuclear 
fuel cycle, Russia would forfeit the sales it would gain by 
selling nuclear fuel and accepting that fuel back.45  
Concurrently, if the Russian ‘state’ does not want Iran to 
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uranium enrichment are contrary to those policies, since 
once the indigenous programs are in place, weaponization is 
relatively easy.46 
3. Private or Bureaucratic Motives 
One possible explanation for Russia allowing countries 
to obtain fuel cycle technology is that bureaucratic actors 
are using short term economic gain as a model.  Those 
bureaucrats may be willing to forgo the prospect for long 
term revenues, because they are only interested in the 
immediate capital gains.  These immediate capital gains are 
generally used to keep their bureaucracies afloat, by 
paying unpaid bills as well as providing regional 
politicians with ‘compensation’ in return for their support 
of nuclear programs.  However, if Iran is able to develop 
an entirely indigenous program, this definitely presents a 
problem in terms of non-proliferation and lost revenues for 
Russia.47 
4. Fatalism 
Another possible reason is fatalism.  According to 
Colonel L.A. Kononov: 
Especially favorable conditions for nuclear 
weapons proliferation have formed in recent 
years.   The saddest thing is that it is 
impossible to eliminate them in the near term.   
This process is occurring at the present time and 
from all appearances will continue subsequently 
despite all efforts by the international 
community to prevent it.48 
                     46 Sokolski, Best of Intentions: America’s Campaign Against Strategic 
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If this type of fatalism is prevalent in the Russian 
community and government, believing that it is impossible 
to prevent nuclear proliferation, then it is possible that 
Russia would be willing to sell dual-use nuclear technology 
to states such as Iran.  Russia may be willing to sell 
technology even though it might mean accepting another 
country into the nuclear club, because it is inevitable 
that those countries will become nuclear “haves” even 
without Russia’s help. 
5. Politics as Usual? 
Russia has treaded a fine line regarding proliferation 
of dual use nuclear exports to India and Iran; however has 
done nothing blatantly against the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty.  It has been discouraged numerous 
times from selling Iran nuclear technology, but has 
continued to do so despite objections from the 
international community. 
The U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and its 
subsequent pursuit of National Missile Defense made Russia 
look weak and unable to prevent this from happening or 
simply unable to exert influence on the United States 
anymore.  Many actions Russia has taken since then have 
been attributed to retaliation for the U.S. withdrawal even 
though Russia denies any reprisals.  On 16 August 2002, 
Defense Minister Ivanov confirmed a statement by a defense 
official that Russia had decided to keep two divisions of 
its MIRVed nuclear missiles, but that it was not a response 
to the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM treaty or its National 
Missile Defense Program.  In response to these actions, 
Ivanov stated:  
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The decision to preserve heavy missiles is not 
"retaliation" for the U.S. withdrawal from the 
ABM Treaty but a "planned measure directed toward 
the development of the country's nuclear 
deterrent forces"49 
But the Russian media came to different conclusions.  
The Nezavisimaya Gazeta decided that “Moscow has come up 
with solutions that can unequivocally be described as 
retaliatory steps for the American secession from the ABM 
Treaty.”50 
Even though Russia’s nuclear export policy predates 
the U.S. decisions to withdraw or not participate from 
bilateral and international treaties and agreements (such 
as the ABM Treaty and the Kyoto Protocol), the continuance 
of those policies in the face of U.S. disapproval serves as 
a reminder to the United States and the international 
community that Russia can not be influenced in decisions it 
believes are of a sovereign nature and stresses that it has 
an autonomous foreign policy.51 
E. CONCLUSIONS 
Russia’s nuclear policy has had many different people 
in the driver’s seat throughout the years, but has not 
significantly changed the way business is conducted.  The 
primary reason for dual-use nuclear exports in the Yeltsin 
era was economic gain.  That holds true today under Putin’s 
watch.  Although Putin has implemented numerous 
governmental reforms, those reforms have really only served 
to strengthen his control and have not changed any 
                     49 FBIS Media Analysis, “Russia — Press Views Retention of Heavy 
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policies.  Economic gain continues to be an important 
reason because of Russia’s weak economy.  Once the economy 
strengthens, there is certainly the possibility that 
nuclear exportation continues, but I would argue at that 
point other motives would become the primary drivers.  Once 
the domestic economy strengthens, one will probably see 
more strategic reasons for foreign exportation of nuclear 
materials and technology.52 
Although capital gain is the primary reason Russia 
bases its nuclear policy, there are certainly other 
considerations that enter into the debate, including 
strategic concerns and national will.  Telling any state 
what it can and can not do, even if it has already agreed 
upon it formally, is a dangerous game and must be done very 
carefully.  This is particularly true with a country such 
as Russia, which is still very much a world power although 
less of a Superpower than it used to be.  Russia will 
continue to flex its national will and ensure the 
international community is well aware that it is an 
autonomous actor and makes foreign policy decisions based 
on the good of Russia versus any political pressure from 
the international community. 

























III. INDIA’S ATV PROGRAM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Why is Russia willing to sell India nuclear submarines 
and technology possibly allowing that technology to be 
available on the global market?  Since 1998 Russia has been 
providing assistance to India’s Advanced Technology Vessel 
(ATV) nuclear submarine program to include assistance in 
the installation of propulsion reactors for the two 
submarines laid down under this program.53  The ATV may be 
capable of launching nuclear-tipped missiles.  This portion 
of the program is also reported to have been initially 
headed by a Russian scientist.54  In the past Russia leased 
an older nuclear Charlie I class submarine to India with a 
Russian crew operating the reactor.55  If the sale of 
nuclear propulsion reactors to India does not happen, then 
it is also possible that India will either purchase or 
again lease one or more Russian nuclear submarines, which 
would be operated solely by Indian crews.56 
If India is able to obtain the technological ability 
to build its own naval nuclear reactors, the possibility 
(however slight) of non-state actors, such as terrorist 
cells, acquiring nuclear technology increases.  
Additionally, there are no international safeguards or 
agreements to prevent India from selling nuclear submarines 
to Iran or North Korea once it is able to establish its own                      53 “Russia helps India build nuclear submarine,” Bellona Foundation 
website, http://www.bellona.org/e/russia/nfl/news/980917-2.htm. 
54 Bedi, “Agni II Now in Production.” 





program.  India is not a party to the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty, therefore has no requirement to adhere to the 
provisions provided within it about not transferring 
nuclear materials to third parties.  Although there are 
provisions from the NPT to prevent any nuclear material 
India acquires directly from another country from getting 
into the hands of a third party, any program India achieves 
indigenously will not be internationally safeguarded.57   
B. THE ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY VESSEL 
The Advanced Technology Vessel has been a concept 
India has been attempting to achieve since the 1970’s.  At 
its inception the ATV program was envisioned as a vessel 
capable of tracking superpower navies in the Indian Ocean, 
but today it is seen as a cruise missile submarine, which 
will one day be capable of deploying nuclear tipped 
missiles.  According to Asian Military Review, the ATV will 
have a (approximately) 100Mw pressure water reactor, which 
has been tested at Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research 
Kalpakkam near Chennai.58 
The director of India’s ATV program is Vice Admiral 
Ganesh (ret.).  VADM Ganesh was the first Captain of the 
INS Chakra, the Soviet Charlie II class nuclear submarine 
India leased from 1988-1991.59  The initial design of the 
ATV was based on the Charlie II submarine and the design 
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was obtained (less the reactor design) from Russia.60  More 
recent reports indicate that the design is based on 
Russia’s fourth generation nuclear submarine, the 
Sevorodvinsk.61  West Germany and Russia provided access to 
India to their reactors used on the nuclear submarines the 
Otto Hahn and the Lenin, respectively.62  Further research 
into the ATV’s reactor is reported to have included a 
Japanese naval nuclear reactor and the likelihood of it 
being suitable for use in a submarine.63  Despite reports 
that indicate otherwise, India has yet to successfully test 
a nuclear reactor for its ATV program, and it is actively 
pursuing leasing two nuclear submarines from Russia until 
the ATV can be commissioned, but according to Russian 
sources the negotiations have been frozen due to funding 
problems.64  Other reports indicated the lease of the two 
Russian nuclear submarines was initially part of the 
Admiral Gorshkov deal, in which India purchased the Kiev-
class aircraft carrier from Russia on January 21, 2004, for 
1.5 billion.65  India’s and Russia’s defense ministers both 
denied that deal included the lease of two Russian Akula 
class nuclear submarines.66  In an article from The Times of 
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India of the same day, the deal was touted as the launch 
pad for a nuclear deal on the Akula submarines as well as 
long range bombers capable of delivering nuclear weapons.67 
According to Jane’s Defence Weekly, the ATV may be 
ready for operational trials in 2008-2009.  Reported 
assistance from Russian experts helped overcome design 
problems with the miniaturization and incorporation of the 
nuclear reactor for the vessel.  The same source indicated 
that the deal to lease the two Akula submarines with an 
option to lease a third was finalized in order to provide 
India with a submarine based Minimum Nuclear Deterrence 
(MND) until the ATV becomes operational.68 
C. NUCLEAR REACTORS 
In 1998, Russia and India finalized a nuclear reactor 
deal (two 1000Mw light water reactors at Koodankulam) that 
had been in the making since 1987; just three weeks after 
India conducted nuclear weapons testing.  Although the 
concern over Russian assistance to an Indian civilian 
nuclear power program was higher in 1998, it waned in the 
years following international realization that India had 
fully weaponized.  However, it is still a valid concern 
that Russia continues to assist a country in its nuclear 
power program that has not signed on to the 
Nonproliferation Treaty.69 
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D. TRAINING AND EXPERTISE 
Indications are that Indian scientists and technicians 
are continually undergoing training at Russia’s 
Novovoronezh facility in order to operate and maintain the 
power plant at Koodankulam.70  In the event of the Akula 
lease being finalized on India’s terms of having only 
Indian crews onboard (vice the reactor being operated by a 
Russian crew as was the previously leased Charlie II), 
those crews would receive training in Russia.  It was 
reported in 2002 that an Indian Navy submarine crew was 
training in Russia on an Akula II submarine.71 
Training of scientists and submarine crews expedite 
India obtaining an indigenous nuclear submarine program.  
Additionally, any assistance Russia provided in the 
miniaturization and incorporation of the naval nuclear 
reactor into India’s ATV increased India’s expertise and 
enabled it to be much closer to its goal of a submarine 
based MND. 
E. CONCLUSIONS 
Russia’s assistance to India’s nuclear submarine 
program can primarily be attributed to the capital gains 
involved from selling the naval nuclear reactor technology 
to India.  Russia’s goal as a state is to ensure its 
survival in the international system.  Although guarding 
state secrets and power resources is one way to ensure the 
attainment of that goal, another sure way is to ensure 
economic strength.   
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Although capital gain is likely the primary reason, 
bureaucratic politics also play an important part.  Nuclear 
research and development (R&D) program funding increases 
when R&D programs help to attain the capital gains.72  If 
Russia’s nuclear agency is able to lobby the Russian 
government and convince them that aiding India in its 
nuclear endeavors will be beneficial to Russia in the long 
run, then MinAtom secures its future survival within the 
Russian state by creating a future role for itself in the 
way of continued research and development.73  Bureaucratic 
politics is also present when it comes for the Russian 
Navy’s requirement for future funding.  If the Russian Navy 
lobbies the Russian government to aid the Indian 
government, it stands to improve allied relations with the 
possibility of gaining a warm water naval base in the 
Indian Ocean.  With this and a naval ally to conduct joint 
operations, the Russian Navy stands to gain a great deal in 
regaining some of the grandiosity it had in its past.  Much 
needed funding for the maintenance of its failing fleet 
drives the Russian Navy to advocate such a course of 
action.   
As Russia regains its economic stability, it will be 
less likely to transfer its power resources to other 
countries for economic purposes.  With economic stability, 
Russian foreign exportation of technology and sales of 
conventional arms and nuclear expertise may still occur, 
but the reasons will likely be based more on strategic and 
bureaucratic versus economic motives.  Often these 
bureaucratic organizations will gain more power in stable 
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democratic economies, but sometimes their influence on the 
state may wane when it comes to deciding certain courses of 
action.  The state may not need to generate economic 
capital the sales and transfer of nuclear technology, but 
may very well determine that it is in its best interests to 
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IV. RUSSIA’S ASSISTANCE TO IRAN 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the Russia’s 
past support toward Iran’s nuclear program.  Included will 
be a description of Iran’s advancements with its nuclear 
power program through 2004 and how Russia has provided 
assistance in the past and continues to provide assistance.  
This chapter also discusses the implications of Russian 
assistance towards Iran obtaining an indigenous nuclear 
weapons program.  Finally, reasons for Russian assistance 
and sales are addressed. 
B. IRAN’S NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAM 
Iran’s nuclear power program consists of numerous 
facilities throughout the country.  These facilities vary 
in their purpose and, until 2004, none have resided under 
full International Atomic Energy Agency, the UN’s nuclear 
watchdog, safeguards.  Even with the recent declared 
cooperation by Iran to fulfill its obligations under the 
NPT, there is still resistance to fully cooperate with the 
IAEA.  Russia does not have interests in every facility, 
but has sold Iran technology and expertise that has helped 
advance most of its nuclear facilities.74 
1. Arak 
The Arak facility is a heavy water production plant 
located 150 miles south of Tehran, and as of mid-August 
2002, this site was 85 percent complete.  Heavy water 
production plants are not fully covered by comprehensive 
                     74 Center for Nonproliferations Studies: Nuclear Threat Initiative 
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IAEA safeguard agreements, and only Iran’s agreement to 
allow inspections can give the IAEA the legal authority to 
inspect it.  The Arak facility also contains a 40 MW IR-40, 
construction of which was planned to start in 2004. The 
facility was reportedly almost complete in January 2004.75 
For the Arak heavy water plant to be of any utility to 
Iran, it would have to be paired with a plutonium 
production reactor that has not yet been located.  Publicly 
reported intelligence in December 1998, revealed that 
Russian nuclear institutes were actively negotiating to 
sell Iran a 40-megawatt heavy-water research reactor and a 
uranium-conversion facility.76 
2. Bushehr 
Even though the nuclear facility at Bushehr falls 
under full IAEA safeguards, Russia's provision of expertise 
and manufacturing assistance has helped Iran to develop its 
own nuclear technology infrastructure. In addition, facing 
economic pressures, some Russian entities have shown a 
willingness to provide assistance to other nuclear projects 
within Iran. For example, an institute within the Ministry 
of Atomic Energy (MinAtom) had agreed to deliver atomic 
vapor laser isotope separation equipment, a technology 
capable of producing weapons-grade uranium. This accusation 
was denied by the Russian government and subsequently the 
delivery never occurred.77 
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At the Bushehr facility there is a 1000 MW nuclear 
power reactor that was due to become operational in the 
second half of 2004.  This site was proposed to initially 
be operated by a joint Russian-Iranian crew.  In 1995, 
Russia and Iran signed an $800 million contract under which 
the former would provide the latter with a light water 
reactor at the Bushehr site.  In early June 2003, Russian 
Atomic Energy Minister Alexander Rumyantsev was reported to 
have said the Bushehr reactor was set to open in 2005.78  
Then, on October 13, 2003, a Russian official said there 
would be a delay of one year in the completion of the 
Bushehr nuclear power reactor. "Right now our specialists 
are drawing up a detailed plan for the plant and the start-
up is set for 2005" as opposed to 2004, Nikolai Shingaryev, 
a senior spokesman for the atomic energy ministry, told AFP 
by telephone. "The reasons are purely technical, not 
political.”79 
Part of the negotiating process between Russia and 
Iran has been to determine the status of Iran’s nuclear 
fuel cycle.  On February 13, 2004, a Russian Energy 
Ministry official said that Iran and Russia might sign the 
protocol on exporting Russian nuclear fuel to Iran`s 
Bushehr Nuclear Plant and return of the used fuel to Russia 
within the next two weeks.80  In May 2004, Alexander 
Rumyantsev stated that the deal to return spent nuclear 
fuel to Russia was to be signed sometime in the summer of 
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2004.81  Additionally, the Ministry of Atomic Energy would 
jump at the chance to build additional reactors in Iran, to 
include three more at Bushehr and two at Ahwaz.82 
3. Tehran 
The facility at Tehran has a research reactor (Tehran 
Research Reactor - TRR), a production facility that deals 
with the molybdenum, iodine, and xenon radioisotopes (MIX 
Facility) and a multipurpose laboratory (Jabr Ibn Hayan - 
JHL).  The JHL was previously undeclared but the IAEA 
discovered there are stores of UF6 (1000 kg), UF4 (400 kg) 
and UO2 (400 kg).83  Iran also informed the IAEA in a letter 
on February 26, 2003, that most of the UF4 was converted to 
uranium metal in 2000 at JHL.84 
At the Ibn-e Heysam Laser Technology Center, a 
subsidiary organization of Tehran Nuclear Research Center 
(TNRC), uranium laser enrichment is studied.  The Russian 
Ministry of Atomic Energy (MinAtom) contracted to provide 
equipment to Iran that was clearly intended for Atomic 
Vapor Laser Isotope Separation (AVLIS).  AVLIS technology 
could provide Iran the means to produce weapons quantities  
of highly enriched uranium.  As a result of U.S. protests, 
the Russian Government halted the delivery of some of this 
equipment to Iran.85 
                     81 Maria Golovnina, “Report: Russia, Iran to Sign Nuke Deal Soon,” 
Washington Post (May 25, 2004). 
82 Angela Charlton, “Russia Expands Nuke Ties With Iran,” Associated 
Press, July 26, 2002. 
83 Center for Nonproliferations Studies: Nuclear Threat Initiative 
database, “Country Overviews: Iran: Nuclear Facilities: Jabr Ibn Hayan 
Multipurpose Laboratories (JHL),” 
http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/Nuclear/3119_3166.html. 
84 International Atomic Energy Agency, “Implementation of the NPT 
Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran” (June 6, 2003). 
85 Andrew Koch and Jeanette Wolf, “Iran’s Nuclear Facilities: A 
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4. Training 
The specific amount of training provided to Iran by 
Russia is unclear; however, it is logical that some 
operational training would be required for the Iranian 
section of the crew for Bushehr.  According to The Guardian 
in 2003, Russia had trained up to 200 Iranian scientists at 
the Obninsk Atomic Energy University.  Officials from the 
university claim that only basic knowledge and skills in 
the operation of the Bushehr plant were taught.86  A month 
later ITAR-TASS reported a similar finding of 500 
specialists trained by Russia in the operation of the 
Bushehr plant with possibly another 200 yet to receive 
training.87 
C. CONCLUSIONS 
Every indication is that Russia assists Iran’s nuclear 
power program.  Russia does not deny this and there is no 
proof that it has violated any international standards.  
What are the global implications of Russian assistance to 
an Iranian nuclear weapons program?  Those implications are 
subtle, but they include the advancement of nuclear 
technology, the training of Iranian technicians (increasing 
the indigenous expertise of Iran), and the increased 
materiel condition of Iran’s nuclear program. 
Iran has accepted IAEA safeguards including the 
additional protocol (December 2003), which allows 
inspections at shorter notice and includes inspections at 
                     86 Nick P. Walsh, “Russian Lessons,” The Guardian (June 16, 2003), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,3604,978077.00.html. 
87 Center for Nonproliferation Studies: Nuclear Threat Initiative 




sites that are indigenous.  However, Iran once ‘postponed’ 
IAEA inspections because of the ‘Iranian New Year’ in March 
2004, and continues to stonewall the IAEA.88 
There are obvious economic gains for Russia involved 
with selling technology to Iran.  Those gains include sales 
worth 800 million US dollars for the Bushehr reactor, 
capital from fuel sales and for the handling of the spent 
fuel.  However, a Stanford economist’s study indicates that 
any gains from returned spent nuclear fuel will only be 
able to fund safe storage of the imported materials and 
existing Russian materials.89  If this study is correct, the 
Atomic Energy Agency may be under pressure to cut corners 
in order to provide the pay-offs promised regional 
politicians in exchange for political support of this plan 
and other nuclear policies. 
A strategic foothold in the Middle East would provide 
Russia with influence on the international scene and with 
the United States.  However, some of Russia’s actions may 
be contradictory to its strategic and economic concerns.  
If Russia assists Iran with certain types of material and 
technology (specifically centrifuges and laser technology – 
uranium enrichment technology), Iran’s ability to produce 
an indigenous program becomes that much more of a 
possibility.  If Iran has an indigenous program, it will no 
longer need Russia for assistance, and may preclude Russia 
from making any economic gain from Iran.  However, if 
bureaucratic actors use short term economic gain as a model 
                     88 Kenneth C. Brill, “Statement on the Implementation of Safeguards 
in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” March 13, 2004. 
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/Misc/2004/brill13032004.html 
89 Chuen, “Russian Nuclear Exports to Iran: U.S. Policy Change 
Needed.” 
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and forgo the prospect for lost revenues, then this could 
explain the current assistance.  Indications also lead one 
to believe that the ‘Russian state’ does not want Iran to 
have a nuclear weapons program.90  If Russia allows Iran to 
achieve an indigenous fuel cycle, an indigenous machining 
process, etc., then the next step to weaponization is 
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A. REASONS FOR RUSSIAN ASSISTANCE 
Russia’s economic decline is one reason it exports 
dual-use nuclear technology.  It is hard for Russia to 
maintain disarmament goals set by existing non-
proliferation treaties and programs because of its economic 
decline.92  It is also difficult for Russia to continue to 
provide jobs or a steady income to the over 120,000 
experts, technicians, and workers who are employed in 
Russia’s nuclear program.93  Without the proper pay and 
other incentives, the threat of nuclear information and 
technology sales and even defection to non-nuclear states 
by these private actors increases.  Similarly, due to the 
declining standard of living for nuclear technicians it is 
just as challenging to recruit new engineers to help 
maintain technological advances in the future, to include 
safety lockouts and safe handling procedures.   
Bureaucratic politics is another factor that has led 
Russia to export nuclear technology.  The Ministry of 
Atomic Energy (MinAtom), in an attempt to maintain its 
status and improve its funding priority in the future, 
often sought to maintain foreign export capability, within 
the confines of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in order to 
obtain capital from foreign countries by selling dual-use 
nuclear technology.  MinAtom and the FAEA use this capital 
to maintain the nuclear industry within Russia.  Additional 
ways the Russian government often uses this capital is to 
                     92 Chuen, “Russian Nuclear Exports to Iran: U.S. Policy Change 
Needed.” 
93 Joseph Cirincione, et al., Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Proliferation 
of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, D.C., 2002), 119. 
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fund further nuclear research and to complete weapons 
projects94, such as the construction of a fourth generation 
nuclear submarine in the Sevorodvinsk class.95 
Does Iran have any other incentives to offer other 
than capital to secure Russia’s assistance in its nuclear 
power program?  Russia’s Navy has been in serious disrepair 
in the post-Soviet era due to economic strain. 
Approximately 70 percent of its ships desperately need 
repairs, only one third of its aircraft are flight ready, 
the number of personnel is 50 percent of what it was in the 
Soviet era, and fleet strength has been reduced by 60 
percent.  In 1998 85-90 percent of the Navy’s budget went 
directly to personnel, however, Russia’s Naval Chief of 
Staff, Admiral Kuroyedov, estimates that the fleet needs 
closer to 60 percent of the budget for maintenance to 
prevent it from ‘rotting away’.96  According to these 
statistics, Russia certainly needs help in the economic 
arena to maintain its Navy. 
1. Russian Economic Decline 
Russia’s transition to a market economy has not been 
an easy one.  Although in more recent years the economic 
outlook has been much more optimistic, throughout the 1990s 
Russia found it difficult to ensure its citizens were fed 
and taken care of.  The priority for funding in the 
military sector decreased significantly due to this.  
Russia ranks number one in total land area, number six in 
                     94 Wallander, “Russia’s Interest in Trading with the ‘Axis of Evil.’” 
95 Vladimir Radyuhin, “India to lease Russian nuclear submarines,” 
The Hindu (January 28, 2002), 
http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2002/01/28/stories/2002012801431000.
htm. 
96 Charles Krupnick, Decommissioned Russian Nuclear Submarines and 
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total population, and yet only sixteenth in Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP).  This places them at 100th in Gross National 
Income (GNI) per capita.97  The trouble Russia has 
encountered with its economy has led to its serious decline 
as a world power; however, its advanced military research 
and development program provides a unique form of leverage 
on the global economic market.  Its advancement in military 
equipment provides Russia with the ability to maintain 
trade with other countries.  By selling military equipment, 
Russia is able to use its military infrastructure as an 
economic advantage towards maintaining its status as a 
superpower. 
By using the state level of analysis to determine why 
Russia is willing to transfer its nuclear power assets and 
military equipment to other countries, specifically in the 
case of naval nuclear reactors; one may be able to see the 
economic advantage Russia achieves by cooperating in the 
nuclear arena with India.  Even though Russia may be 
perceived to be breaking a global norm by assisting India 
in its nuclear submarine program, it may be able to justify 
its actions by way of economic benefit and a semblance of 
maintaining existing contracts:  Russia is not breaking any 
non-proliferation treaty regulations (contract) by 
assisting India (India is already a nuclear nation) Russia 
has long been a strategic partner with India, and lastly by 
further cooperating with India, Russia may secure future 
trade (economic benefit) and cooperation from a possible 
superpower of the twenty-first century.  These reasons may 
not correlate to classic realism; however, they may give 
Russia the ability to preserve its national security in the 
                     97 World Bank Group Website, “Russian Economic Report Number 8,” 
http://ns.worldbank.org.ru/files/rer/RER_8_eng.pdf. 
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short term by maintaining a strategic alliance with a 
powerful ally until it is able to recover from the economic 
losses it has suffered throughout the last two decades.  At 
the same time, by forging a strong relationship with India, 
Russia may be able to accelerate its economic recovery 
through trade and cooperation. 
2. Defection of Experts 
On an individual level of analysis, the amount of 
workers currently employed in Russia’s nuclear industry may 
base their decisions on the likelihood of receiving their 
next paycheck.  If nuclear experts determine that Russia is 
unable to meet their standard of living requirements or 
desires, they may make a conscious decision to sell their 
knowledge to India or other countries.  Although no sources 
have indicated this is the case in the India-Russia ATV 
study, the possibility continues to exist for individual 
defection or assistance in nuclear matters for 
compensation.  To prevent individual defection and 
individuals personally selling knowledge, or brain drain, 
Russia might enter into a contractual agreement with India, 
Iran or other countries in order to maintain some control 
over what information passes across Russian borders.  In 
turn foreign nations might not attempt to lure Russian 
individuals with monetary enticement if Russia is 
cooperating with them on the state level.  This contractual 
agreement benefits all parties.  It benefits the foreign 
nation, since it receives technological help on a problem 
it has been unable to solve indigenously.  The agreement 
would also benefit Russia through capital gain for its 
assistance and government control in the levels of 
information that it lends to other countries. 
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Russia’s staggering economy has given it little choice 
but to bargain and seek contracts with countries such as 
India and Iran.98  These contracts have been in the form of 
military aid and support in India’s nuclear submarine and 
other nuclear programs and Iran’s nuclear energy program 
throughout the years.  These contracts have been necessary 
to infuse capital into Russia’s industrial sector and to 
secure jobs and income for many of Russia’s workers, to 
include experts in the nuclear sector. 
3. Bureaucratic Politics 
Bureaucratic infighting is a problem in Russia as much 
as it is in the United States, if not more so.  Whether or 
not Russia has a poor economy, the levels of bureaucracy 
will still be competing for their program funding priority.  
The Atomic Energy Agency is responsible for the 
‘development, production, and conversion of both nuclear 
explosive charges and corresponding ammunition, as well as 
in the sphere of nuclear engineering’.99  If the FAEA feels 
that it is unable fulfill its duties due to insufficient 
funding, it may be compelled as an organization to lobby 
the Russian government to cooperate with other countries in 
nuclear matters.  By achieving this goal of multi-national 
cooperation, the FAEA increases its importance as a federal 
organization and therefore increasing its program funding 
priority.100  The FAEA is also responsible for ensuring the 
requirements of all international agreements on the 
transfer of nuclear materials and technology are fulfilled, 
                     98 Wallander, “Russia’s Interest in Trading with the ‘Axis of Evil.’” 
99 “Mission of the Ministry of Russian Federation on nuclear energy,” 
http://www.minatom.ru/english/about/mission.html. 
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but this organization and its predecessors have been able 
to find loopholes in these agreements in the past. 
The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program is an 
instance where Russia has entered into a contractual 
agreement with the United States to assist it in the 
elimination of its nuclear weapons.  Without the aid and 
financial support of the US, Russia would be unable to meet 
current nuclear weapons reduction goals.  Much of the 
financial support of the CTR program goes towards 
retraining weapon scientists in the former Soviet Union.  
This contract and the financial support that comes with it 
helps maintain MinAtom’s funding priority, as it is the 
agency that is responsible for the deactivation and 
reduction of Russia’s nuclear weapons.101 
a. Naval Cooperation 
Another government organization that stands to 
gain importance with the transfer of naval nuclear 
technology to India is the Russian Navy.  As discussed 
previously, the Russian Navy has fallen into serious 
disrepair in the post-Cold War era.  Just as with Russia’s 
Atomic Energy Agency and every other bureaucratic 
organization, the Russian Navy must compete for funding 
from the Russian government.  The more the navy sells its 
importance in maintaining Russia’s superpower status, the 
more likely it is to secure future funding for not only 
maintenance, but also research and development of new 
technology, ships, submarines, and aircraft.  If and when 
India purchases or leases Russian nuclear submarines, the 
Russian Navy will gain not only required funding, but it 
                     101 Center for Nonproliferation Studies: Nuclear Threat Initiative 
Database, “The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program,” 
http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/forasst/nunn_lug/overview.htm. 
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will also serve to increase its importance in the structure 
of the Russian government.  The additional funding acquired 
in any deals with India will help to maintain its nuclear 
and conventional fleet. 
The FAEA and the Russian Navy are both 
organizations of groups of individuals and therefore fall 
into the individual level of analysis.  The perceptions and 
priorities of these organizations matter when they 
determine their individual courses of action.  Sometimes 
these courses of actions may include decisions that are 
contrary to realists perceptions of the way states act to 
maintain its survival.  By making decisions that increase 
their importance in the scope of Russia’s governmental 
organizations, they in effect secure their own survival.  
At the state level of analysis, the Russian government may 
yield to organizational lobbying in order to secure support 
from individuals and organizations for its survival as a 
government.  This is another possible reason that Russia 
may attempt to enter into contracts that include 
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